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The invitation to give a presentation at the Young Pugwash (ISYP) workshop on New Chal-
lenges to Human Security in Wageningen, the Netherlands and contribute this comment came 
at the right time. With the academic year drawing to a close, and the number of MA theses of a 
new generation of conflict researchers piling up on my desk, the ISYP request allowed me to 
pause for a moment and look critically at my field of study. ‘What are the lacunas in conflict 
research?’ the ISYP organisation wanted to know. ‘Where do our analyses or approaches fail? 
And: do we ask the right questions?’ The art of formulating questions lies at the heart of 
academic thinking and, interestingly, prompting and important questions such as these are 
often asked by people outside of ones own area of expertise. In this brief article I will focus on 
the first two questions and discuss a number of lacunas, mantras and pitfalls in the new field of 
study that Conflict Studies is by means of six brief statements and recommendations (see the 
headers of the following sections). Hopefully, this will inspire people to ‘ask the right ques-
tions’ when it comes to understanding how and why people resort to collective violence.  
The interpretation of violence is political 
Over the past decades, mainstream views on violent conflict in the media and countless UN 
and World Bank reports, consultancy documents, and NGO briefings have shifted substantially. 
During the Cold War, local conflicts were mostly seen as ‘proxy wars’ and explained in terms 
of ideological divides (communism/capitalism) and super power strategy, at times combined 
with political turmoil connected to processes of post-independence state-building. After the 
Cold War, the violent conflicts in the Balkans, Indonesia, and Africa were coded as ‘ethnic’ or 
‘ethnonationalist’: ancient hatreds and primordialist identities were seen as root causes. Since 
the late 1990s, increasingly conflicts are framed as driven by greed, ‘terror’, criminality and 
warlordism.  
Not surprisingly, this shift in mainstream conflict analysis coincided with a paradigm shift 
in the international arena. The ‘ancient hatred’ view matched the principle of non-interference, 
which prevailed during the early 1990s: exemplified by the reluctance of the international 
community to intervene in wars in, for instance, the former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
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Particularly after 9/11, criminality became the dominant policy framework through which local 
wars were understood and dealt with. Increasingly, organised violence in Congo, Angola, 
Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Colombia, Chechnya and Afghanistan was depicted as 
illegitimate, abusive, reigned by terror and potentially threatening regional and global security. 
This new understanding of local war established both a justification and legitimation for 
intervention, in line with the Bush doctrine and the War on Terror. 
The interpretation of violence is political. The selection of a form and level of explanation 
for contemporary violent conflict is a serious political act in the sense that representations have 
political implications. The way in which violent incidents and conflicts are coded and 
categorised will play – intentionally, or not – a role in casting blame and responsibility [1]. 
Since the interpretation and representation of conflict and violence can have enormous conse-
quences (from ‘letting them fight it out amongst themselves’ attitudes of the early 1990s to the 
‘military humanism’ or ‘will to govern’ of today) there is a great need to critically examine the 
social phenomena of contemporary violent conflict, its interpretations and their consequences. 
Identity is crucial, but should be handled with caution 
Despite the great variety of views on contemporary conflict most authors acknowledge the key 
role of the identity group (however problematic). Azar [2] was one of the first in the field who 
argued for a radical revision of Clausewitzean ideas by claiming that it was the identity group –
ethnic, religious, cultural and other – and not the nation-state that was at the core of most 
contemporary conflicts. Although today the ‘extra-state’ wars conducted by the US in 
Afghanistan and Iraq attract the lion’s share of media attention, Azar’s claim is still supported 
by evidence: in the 1989-2004 period 94 per cent of worldwide violent conflicts were intra-
state wars [3,4]. This is not to say that ‘identity’ or ‘identity differences’ are causing violent 
conflict. Although this idea is frequently unknowingly used in the media, among academics the 
‘ancient hatred’ view is generally rejected, and primordialism is mentioned only when scholars 
want to point out what they are not. Instead, identity boundary drawing is seen as a central aspect 
of the mobilisation of support for armed conflict in the world today. Still, identity labels should 
be handled with caution: actors in civil war cannot be treated as if they were unitary. The 
problem with ‘identity’ is that although semantically ‘identity’ implies sameness across time or 
persons, most (constructivist) analysts continue to speak of ‘identity’ while at the same time 
repudiating this implication of ‘sameness’ [5]. This problem also arises in the study of intra-
state war: the concept of ‘identity group conflict’ or group violence entails the total inter-
changeability of individuals, both as participants and perpetrators and as targets. However, as 
Kalyvas [6] points out, civil wars are not binary conflicts, but complex and ambiguous process-
es that foster interaction among actors with distinct identities and interests. ‘It is the conver-
gence of local motives and supralocal imperatives that endow civil war with its particular 
character and leads to joint violence that straddles the divide between the political and the 
private, the collective and the individual’ [7]. The study of contemporary conflict should there-
fore consist of a systematic analysis of group dynamics, interests and alliances at various levels: 
including local and national actors, insiders and outsiders, individuals and organisations, 
civilians and armies. 
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The field of Conflict Studies is inventing the wheel 
Parallel to the increase in civil wars (since the 1950s) the desire to understand, prevent and 
contain these conflicts resulted in a boom in research and training institutes on Conflict 
Studies, Conflict Resolution, Peace and Conflict, and Human Security, often closely tied to 
policy debates. However, this new field – understandably – has its weaknesses. Much older 
academic traditions often accuse the field (and in particular studies of ethnic conflict) of 
‘inventing the wheel’: e.g. Ignatieff [8] turning to Freud to explain why ‘neighbors kill’, over-
looking the work of Social Identity theorists who study the process of identity group competi-
tion; and the intellectual wall between the study of ethnic conflict and long traditions of 
scholarly theorising about group mobilisation and collective violence. Clearly, Conflict research 
can greatly benefit from drawing on these established scholarly traditions. 
Multidisciplinarity is not obvious 
‘Young’ as it may be, Conflict Studies has its own set of mantras. The two most prominent 
mantras in the field are the repeated stress on ‘conflict is complex’, and the ‘need to be 
multidisciplinary’. A combination of these two mantras (‘multidisciplinarity is complex’) may 
do the field some good, since multidisciplinarity is too often taken for granted. The various 
approaches to conflict and violence that the field of Conflict Studies seeks to combine under 
the heading of ‘multidisciplinarity’ are not simply heterogeneous, but in fact often point in 
(sharply) differing directions. To be sure, there are affinities between certain of them, but there 
are strong tensions as well. The study of conflict bears a multivalent, and at times even 
contradictory theoretical burden.  
As conflict researchers we need not only to be aware of the different theoretical 
approaches to conflict, but also pay (more) attention to their underlying assumptions, their 
affinities and contradictions. I argue that there is no such thing as a ‘grand theory of violent 
conflict’, and see no use in seeking to come to a coherent integrated synthesis of the approach-
es available. Rather, we need to be more explicit in the way we position the various relevant 
theoretical views vis-à-vis each other and within a broader frame. This will allow students of 
conflict to do their bricolage, but in a well-informed, and knowledgeable way.  
Conflict = clustered violent episodes 
Too often conflict and violence are lumped together as one and the same thing. We need to 
take a closer look. Under the heading of ‘the Sri Lanka conflict’, ‘the Colombia conflict’, ‘the 
war in Bosnia’, ‘Rwanda’, or basically any other ‘intrastate war’, many different forms of violent 
incidents take place. If, for instance, the media talk about the Sri Lanka conflict flaring up 
again, what we see on the ground are various, at times unrelated violent incidents: in-fighting 
between competing factions within the Tamil Tigers in the East, villagers killed by land-mines 
in the North, violent incidents in the South between Muslims and Tamils militias, and yes, 
‘conventional warfare’ between the Government of Sri Lanka’s (GoSL) army and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ) cadres.  
What in fact often happens is that violent episodes are clustered, are lumped together and 
called a conflict. Consequently, all violence that occurs is placed under the heading of the 
master narrative, the master cleavage. Often the great variety of violent incidents and episodes 
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are perceived as mere (and rather irrelevant) local manifestations of the central conflict 
cleavage (GoSL versus LTTE, Hutu vs. Tutsi, Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, FARC, 
vs. Colombian army or paramilitaries, etc.).  They are seen as automatic and unproblematic 
after effects of actions and decisions located at the centre. However, ethnographies of collec-
tive violence during civil wars show a much more complex picture. Violence in an ethnic or 
class war may not be ethnic or class violence. Very often under the heading of the master 
narrative many different forms of violent acts occur: private, criminal, sexual violence, the 
settling of old scores, land conflicts, family feuds etc. Most macro studies of conflict disregard 
the private content of political violence and miscode individual cases. This calls for fine-
grained analysis that takes into account the different forms of violence. It is the interaction 
between local and central, private and political spheres that counts, and helps us to understand 
the dynamics of intra-state war.  
Analysis matters 
Our ‘readings’ of a conflict will for a large extent determine what sorts of intervention we 
design. Too often lack of analytical tools and lack of grounded critical analysis of collective 
violence and conflict results in ad hoc policy making, and misreading. As researchers we have 
to be highly aware of the political landscape in which we operate and of the political implica-
tions of our representations. The task of conflict analysis is to unravel the complex dynamics 
of interactive processes in order to understand how and why people resort to violence. 
Conflict policy should be based on solid, critical, and grounded analysis. This is an important 
field of study. There is a lot to be learned. Analysis matters, for there is a lot at stake. 
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